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Human Rights Lost: 
The (Re)making of an American Story 
Christopher N.J. Roberts 
The historical study of human rights has become an 
important area of inquiry in recent years. In analyzing the 
historical trajectory of human rights, legal scholars and 
historians have typically focused on the human rights laws, 
treaties, and charters that originated in the past and remain 
powerful today. Yet some of the most transformative events in 
our nation’s history have escaped notice through such 
approaches. This Article introduces a new approach to the 
historical study of human rights by focusing not on established 
law, but rather on three “legal failures” that are completely 
invisible within the framework of binding law and precedent: a 
failed constitutional amendment in Washington D.C.; an 
overruled appellate opinion from California; and an unlikely 
movement to replace the United Nations with a more powerful 
“world government.” This analysis reveals a surprising truth: 
these legal failures permanently altered the trajectory of the 
United States’ approach to human rights and continue to shape 
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contemporary human rights institutions and practices. This 
Article makes three key claims. First, a complete explanatory 
account of contemporary institutions and practices must include 
more than those laws, institutions, ideas, and practices that 
persist into the present day; it must also account for numerous 
legal, institutional, and ideational antecedents that are no 
longer with us. Second, the dominant conception of human rights 
within the United States—as an international rather than 
domestic phenomenon—was actively created domestically in the 
United States after World War II in order to advance a range of 
ongoing, local-level political struggles. Third, to the extent that 
human rights supporters in the United States today fail to 
appreciate these domestic origins, it is quite possible that they 
become unwitting collaborators of those who objected to the idea 
of universal human rights in the past. 
Introduction 
For those waging social justice struggles in the United 
States, human rights are not much of a domestic option—nor are 
they much of a thought. In the United States, human rights are 
viewed as matters of international concern rather than laws for 
domestic application. International treaties, for instance, are 
signed with the stipulation that human rights concepts do not 
apply in the domestic arena and domestic judges rarely use 
international human rights concepts in domestic decisions.1 This 
international conception of human rights is widespread in the 
United States and is rarely challenged by scholars, activists, or 
the legal community. Human rights are simply, and perhaps 
inevitably, viewed as matters for international rather than 
domestic consumption. The fact that they are rarely applied in 
the domestic context has limited their domestic presence in 
domestic research, advocacy, and law.2 
 
 1. See M. Shah Alam, Enforcement of International Human Rights by 
Domestic Courts in the United States, 10 ANN. SURV. INT’L & COMP. L. 27, 27–
31 (2004) (explaining that while the United States is active in pursuing 
international human rights instruments, the application of those is not common 
in domestic courts); see generally Elena A. Baylis, General Comment 24: 
Confronting the Problem of Reservations to Human Rights Treaties, 17 
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 277, 277 (1999) (discussing the propensity for States to 
sign human rights treaties with reservations, meaning that while they remain 
in technical compliance, States are free to engage in the practices such treaties 
condemn). 
 2. See generally MICHAEL JOHN GARCIA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
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This Article argues that the uniquely American conception 
of human rights as international rather than domestic is neither 
inevitable nor is it without consequence for those engaged in the 
study and practice of human rights. Rather, this conception of 
human rights was crafted in the years immediately following the 
Second World War through a series of influential domestic 
political struggles. These struggles pitted opposing definitions of 
human rights against one another, ultimately resulting in the 
triumph of an international-only conception of the term. 
Although such struggles largely have been unexplored within 
existing scholarship, this Article shows that they altered the 
trajectory of human rights in the United States and left an 
indelible mark on contemporary human rights debates. 
Through a detailed analysis of new historical and archival 
data, this Article investigates three historical events that offer a 
window into the political struggles surrounding how best to 
define the emergent human rights concept in the post-war era. 
They include a failed constitutional amendment in Washington 
D.C.,3 an overruled appellate opinion from California,4 and an 
improbable movement to reorganize the world into nine 
“kindred” societies.5 Interestingly, a scholar studying the history 
of human rights will not find any direct evidence of such events 
when examining existing law or foundational international 
human rights texts such as the 1948 Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights. Yet, this analysis demonstrates that each event 
permanently altered the trajectory of the United States’ 
approach to human rights. 
This Article therefore reveals that the United States’ 
contemporary approach to human rights is the consequence of 
not just the laws on the books, but rather, that it has been 
shaped by laws, ideas, and institutions that by all accounts have 
been passed off by historians as legal failures. In analyzing the 
failed amendment, overturned case, and a forgotten movement, 
this Article also outlines a novel insight and new methodological 
approach for legal historians—laws, cases, and movements that 
 
RL32528, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND AGREEMENTS: THEIR EFFECT UPON U.S. 
LAW 12–16 (2015) (explaining that the effect of an international treaty depends 
on whether the treaty is self-executing on its date of ratification as compared to 
a conflicting domestic law). 
 3. See S.J. Res. 102, 82d Cong. (1951). 
 4. See Fujii v. State, 217 P.2d 481 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1950). 
 5. See Comm. to Frame a World Constitution, Preliminary Draft of a 
World Constitution, art. 5 (1948) [hereinafter Preliminary Draft of a World 
Constitution]. 
4 MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT'L LAW [Vol. 26:1 
failed to come into being or achieve permanence in the American 
legal system that can nevertheless exert significant influence on 
contemporary affairs.6 
The proposition that legal failures can alter the course of 
history is not as improbable as it might appear at first glance. 
To be sure, within a standard doctrinal analysis there is little if 
any place for overruled case law, rescinded legislation, or 
proposals that never in fact became law in the first instance. 
Precedent, binding law, and valid legal authority is what 
matters. But when examining the history of the law, legal 
failures can be extremely important transformative agents of 
change, even if scholars routinely overlook them. While this 
Article focuses on the importance of this proposition for the field 
 
 6. The literature on the history of human rights has expanded greatly in 
the past decade or so. A sampling from this ever-growing body of scholarship 
includes CAROL ANDERSON, EYES OFF THE PRIZE: THE UNITED NATIONS AND 
THE AFRICAN AMERICAN STRUGGLE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, 1944–55 (2003) 
(discussing how the Cold War and United States participation in the United 
Nations stymied the ability of African American leaders to advocate for social 
and economic rights); ELIZABETH BORGWARDT, A NEW DEAL FOR THE WORLD: 
AMERICA’S VISION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (2005) (discussing how New Deal values 
influenced post-World War II international political and legal institutions); 
MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE OF 
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2000) (discussing the relationship between the United 
States civil rights conditions and United States foreign relations during the 
Cold War); HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (Stefan-Ludwig 
Hoffmann ed., 2011) (examining how human rights shaped universal morality 
in the political crises and conflicts of the 1900s); ROGER NORMAND & SARAH 
ZAIDI, HUMAN RIGHTS AT THE UN: THE POLITICAL HISTORY OF UNIVERSAL 
JUSTICE (2008) (outlining the political history of human rights in the period 
before and after the creation of the United Nations in light of national rivalries, 
bureaucratic politics, and demands by disadvantaged groups); CHRISTOPHER 
N.J. ROBERTS, THE CONTENTIOUS HISTORY OF THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS (2015) (addressing the conflicting ideas of what human rights 
are and how those ideas were merged into fundamental human rights 
documents); Kenneth Cmiel, The Recent History of Human Rights, 109 AM. 
HIST. REV. 117 (2004) (highlighting the changes in historians’ approaches to 
human rights in the 1990s); Zachary Elkins, Tom Ginsburg & Beth Simmons, 
Getting to Rights: Treaty Ratification, Constitutional Convergence, and Human 
Rights Practice, 54 HARV. INT’L L.J. 61 (2013) (examining the adoption of 
human rights into national constitutions post-World War II); William I. 
Hitchcock, The Rise and Fall of Human Rights? Searching for a Narrative from 
the Cold War to the 9/11 Era, 37 HUM. RTS. Q. 80, 82 (2015) (arguing that 
human rights have become entrenched in politics because powerful states have 
protected them); Samuel Moyn, Substance, Scale, and Salience: The Recent 
Historiography of Human Rights, 8 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 123, 129 (2012) 
(postulating that historians are focusing more than the norms, doctrines, and 
law, but also on the scale of application and differing ideologies). 
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of human rights, the insight undoubtedly extends across areas 
of law and historical legal scholarship. 
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I begins by 
discussing the historical context surrounding the political 
struggles to define the emergent human rights concept in the 
United States. This context, though often neglected in existing 
scholarship, is critical to understanding the well-known efforts 
by Ohio Senator John Bricker in the early 1950s to amend the 
United States Constitution. Part I continues by discussing what 
is known about Bricker’s efforts. Though Bricker’s proposals to 
amend the Constitution were never passed, the threat of the 
amendment was sufficient to alter the actions of leading political 
figures with respect to international human rights laws. 
Moreover, the intent of Bricker’s amendment—to curb the 
nation’s human rights treaty-making abilities and ambitions—
remains with us today. The section demonstrates that it is 
essential for scholars to locate and analyze the lasting effects of 
such “failures” and shows that although much has been written 
about Bricker, there is much that remains missing from the 
narrative. 
Part II begins to address gaps in historical human rights 
scholarship through an analysis of Fujii v. State,7 a watershed 
case in 1950 that invalidated a state law based on the human 
rights principles outlined in the 1945 United Nations Charter. 
Though it was quickly overruled, the case set in motion a lasting 
series of transformative events in the history of the United 
States’ relationship with international human rights law. The 
analysis of the case both illustrates the relevance of legal 
failures and introduces a second key argument; despite the 
contemporary conception of human rights as an international 
phenomenon, the battle over human rights treaties actually 
reflected local-level struggles that eventually helped to define 
human rights within the domestic context.8 
 
 7. Fujii, 217 P.2d 481. 
 8. The Fujii case is examined in varying detail in the following studies: 
KIM VOSS, THE MAKING OF AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM: THE KNIGHTS OF 
LABOR AND CLASS FORMATION IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY (1993); 
Jane Dailey, Race, Marriage, and Sovereignty in the New World Order, 10 
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 511, 525–30 (2009); Aya Gruber, Who’s Afraid of 
Geneva Law?, 39 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1017, 1070–72 (2007); Vicki C. Jackson, World 
Habeas Corpus, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 303, 330–32 (2006); John E. Noyes, Roger 
J. Traynor Professorship, 39 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 381, 387–88 (2009); Judith 
Resnik, Law’s Migration: American Exceptionalism, Silent Dialogues, and 
Federalism’s Multiple Ports of Entry, 115 YALE L.J. 1564, 1601–09 (2006); 
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Part III continues to fill the void in existing scholarship by 
analyzing the lasting consequences of a now largely-forgotten 
“world government” movement that once aimed to dismantle the 
United Nations and replace it with a stronger, more powerful 
global organization.9 Though the movement for global 
government—which occurred in the late 1940s and early 
1950s—experienced a series of unprecedented political and 
legislative victories, it ultimately collapsed under the weight of 
its own success, but not before imparting a lasting influence on 
how the United States was to view itself in international and 
domestic affairs. Thus the movement provides additional 
evidence of the Article’s two key claims: that even legal failures 
can have enormous significance for the contemporary world and 
that human rights struggles in the United States invariably 
reflect local-level struggles. 
Part IV of this Article synthesizes key lessons from each 
section and offers a novel normative appraisal of the 
contemporary place of human rights within domestic law, policy, 
and scholarship. The section argues that the contemporary 
conception of human rights was not inevitable, but rather was 
determined by a series of local-level struggles over how to best 
define human rights in the post-war era. While the relatively 
well-known Bricker story offers a partial glimpse of these 
struggles, a full account of the historical context surrounding 
such struggles has to this point remained hidden from view. By 
exposing the broader context, this Article shows that the victory 
in such struggles was in fact a conception of human rights that 
prioritized international over domestic application. Part IV 
concludes by arguing that this conception has important 
consequences for both law and scholarship. 
I. A FAILED CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 
In the closing days of the Second World War, the soon-to-be 
victorious Allies united in San Francisco to create an 
international institution that would ensure lasting international 
 
Johan D. van der Vyver, The Binding Force of Economic and Social Rights 
Listed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 30 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & 
POL’Y 125, 164–68 (2008). 
 9. The “world government” political movement was “to establish a 
constitutionally limited, democratically representative, federal world 
government in order to effectively abolish war.” 1 JOSEPH PRESTON BARATTA, 
THE POLITICS OF WORLD FEDERATION: UNITED NATIONS, UN REFORM, ATOMIC 
CONTROL 1 (2004). 
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peace and security.10 It is within the founding text of this 
international institution—the United Nations (“UN”)—that the 
contemporary idea of international human rights began to take 
shape. The UN Charter (“the Charter”) articulated a 
commitment to uphold the human rights of citizens.11 In 
subsequent years, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(“UDHR”), a non-binding statement of principle, and the 
International Covenant (“the Covenant”), a binding 
international treaty, were to offer greater specificity and legal 
grounding to the schematic articulation of human rights that 
was offered in the Charter.12 
These foundational texts are crucial to understanding the 
history of human rights. Yet, as this Article argues, scholars and 
historians must be more mindful of how the epic domestic legal 
struggles surrounding human rights—many of which have long 
been cast off as inconsequential failures—have played a greater 
role in defining what human rights are and what place, if any, 
they have in law in the United States. Part I of this Article 
begins with an overview of the background of the post-World 
War II historical context that provides the backdrop for the 
events in question. It then examines what is known about 
Senator John Bricker’s failed Constitutional amendment and its 
lasting influence. As a departure point for the rest of this Article, 
it then provides a critical analysis of the blind spots and gaps in 
the existing historical literature. 
 
 10. History of the United Nations, UNITED NATIONS, 
http://www.un.org/en/sections/history/history-united-nations/ (last visited Oct. 
19, 2016). 
 11. U.N. Charter art. 1, ¶ 3 (“[I]n promoting and encouraging respect for 
human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to 
race, sex, language, or religion . . . .”). 
 12. What was originally intended to be a single Covenant that contained 
civil, political, and socioeconomic rights was split in 1952 into the two 
Covenants we have today—the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural 
Rights. Together, the UDHR and the two Covenants are considered to be the 
foundational human rights texts in the contemporary international system of 
human rights. To avoid the obvious anachronism, in this Article when speaking 
in historical context prior to 1952, I use the singular, “Covenant.” See JEFFREY 
DUNOFF ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: NORMS, ACTORS, PROCESS: A PROBLEM-
ORIENTED APPROACH, 379–81 (4th ed. 2015). 
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A. BACKGROUND: HUMAN RIGHTS STRUGGLES IN THE UNITED 
STATES 
The human rights principles embodied in the Charter, the 
UDHR, and the Covenant represented the principle that what 
took place within one nation’s borders was properly a concern for 
other nations. This principle was not novel in the domestic legal 
context in the United States; the relevance of international 
agreements for domestic law had been established in past 
precedent. In nineteenth century America, for instance, many 
local land disputes necessarily implicated existing international 
agreements between sovereign nations.13 In 1920, the United 
States Supreme Court, for instance, issued a landmark ruling in 
Missouri v. Holland, holding a bilateral migratory bird treaty to 
be the “supreme law of the land” for every state in the nation.14 
As of October 1945, the official birth of the United Nations, 
the United States and other member states had to contend with 
a strikingly new innovation within the Charter’s brief provisions 
on human rights. Within the Charter’s relatively vague, 
preliminary articulation of human rights stood an important 
proposition that spoke not of land or resources, but rather of the 
treatment of individuals. Notably, under the terms of the 
Charter, how individuals were treated in the domestic setting 
had international repercussions. Citizens, it appeared, were now 
a proper subject of international law. 
Articles 55 and 56 of the Charter took the initial steps 
toward defining this human rights concept anew for the post-
World War II context. Article 55 reads: 
With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and 
well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly 
relations among nations based on respect for the 
principle of equal rights and self-determination of 
peoples, the United Nations shall promote: 
 
 13. See Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253, 314–16 (1829) (establishing the 
concept of non-self-executing treaties); United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. 51, 
82–98 (1833) (reversing Foster by holding that a treaty between Spain and the 
United States was self-executing); see also Carlos M. Vázquez, Foster v. Neilson 
and United States v. Percheman: Judicial Enforcement of Treaties, in 
INTERNATIONAL LAW STORIES 151, 168 (John E. Noyes et al. eds., 2007); David 
L. Sloss, Executing Foster v. Neilson: The Two-Step Approach to Analyzing Self-
Executing Treaties, 53 HARV. INT’L L. J. 135, 143–59 (2012). 
 14. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433–35 (1920). 
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a. higher standards of living, full employment, 
and conditions of economic and social progress and 
development; 
b.  solutions of international economic, social, 
health, and related problems; and international 
cultural and educational cooperation; and 
c.  universal respect for, and observance of, 
human rights and fundamental freedoms for all 
without distinction as to race, sex, language, or 
religion.15 
In turn, Article 56 provides that “[a]ll Members pledge 
themselves to take joint and separate action in cooperation with 
the Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth 
in Article 55.”16 Thus, the two articles set forth a preliminary 
definition of the new post-war human rights concept. This 
definition stressed that the well-being of citizens of United 
Nations member states was the appropriate subject of 
international concern. Moreover, the articles established the 
commitment that member states would uphold and promote the 
human rights of citizens. The sovereignty of states, of course, 
was not dead—or even flagging. Article 2(7) of the UN Charter 
states: 
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize 
the UN to intervene in matters which are essentially 
within the domestic jurisdiction of any state . . . but this 
principle shall not prejudice the application of 
enforcement measures under Chapter VII.17  
In contemporary human rights research, foundational 
human rights texts like the Charter, the UDHR, and the 
Covenants, are, of course, crucial parts of the story. Without 
these documents, the contemporary international system of 
human rights would not exist in anything close to its current 
form.18 That said, it is also crucial for scholars and historians not 
 
 15. U.N. Charter art. 55. 
 16. Id. art. 56. 
 17. Id. art. 2, ¶ 7. Chapter VII covers “Action with respect to threats to the 
peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression.” Id. arts. 39–51. 
 18. The United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner 
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to rely exclusively on the content of these documents to tell the 
history of human rights. There are countless events and 
contextual representations of the formation of human rights that 
appear nowhere in the legal texts today that nevertheless shed 
just as much, if not more, light on the history.19 
Even before the United Nations could articulate specific 
human rights provisions or nations could enact domestic 
implementing legislation, the idea that certain domestic social 
matters were properly a matter of concern for members of the 
international community began to have consequences. Within 
the United States in the late 1940s, for instance, the Truman 
administration recognized that the United States’ treatment of 
its own citizens had become a political challenge for some State 
Department officials. In 1947, a presidential commission on civil 
rights wrote in its report that “[a]n American diplomat cannot 
forcefully argue for free elections in foreign lands without 
meeting the challenge that in many sections of America qualified 
voters do not have free access to the polls.”20 Local domestic 
issues such as discrimination, the authors of the report 
maintained, are not sealed within the nation’s own borders; they 
“echo from one end of the globe to the other.”21 
In 1950, the United States State Department amplified this 
assertion when it revealed to the American public the 
foundations of its new foreign policy approach in a 100-page 
report entitled Our Foreign Policy.22 The State Department 
stated the foundation of its new approach to foreign affairs was 
rooted in a new post-War global reality.23 Nations—including 
the United States—could no longer hide beneath a false mantle 
of absolute sovereignty and argue that their own domestic 
policies were of no concern to other nations. 
 
has identified nine core international human rights documents, including the 
UDHR and the Covenants. See OFFICE OF THE U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR HUM. 
RTS., THE CORE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES, at v, U.N. Sales No. 
E/06/XIV/2 (2006). 
 19. For instance, one might look to drafting debates at the U.N., State 
Department policy meetings, public opinion polls, or representations of human 
rights in the media and in popular literature to locate important events 
surrounding the development of the modern human rights concept. 
 20. U.S. PRESIDENT’S COMM. ON CIVIL RIGHTS, TO SECURE THESE RIGHTS: 
THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RIGHTS 101 (1947). 
 21. Id. at 100. 
 22. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, OFFICE OF PUB. AFF., PUBLICATION 3972, OUR 
FOREIGN POLICY 4 (1950). 
 23. Id. at 7–11 (describing the current state of global affairs). 
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Our Foreign Policy began with a basic premise: “There is no 
longer any real distinction between ‘domestic’ and ‘foreign’ 
affairs.”24 It then provided a series of examples of domestic 
affairs that were now inseparable from foreign affairs. 
Practically everything we do, the way we tax and spend our 
national income, the way we run our public and private business, 
the way we settle the differences among ourselves and with 
other nations, what we say in our newspapers, over the air and 
on public platforms, our attitudes toward each other and toward 
other peoples—all these things affect not only our security and 
well-being at home, but also our influence abroad.25 
The Report concluded by offering its readers an appraisal of 
the existing global reality. The longstanding distinction between 
domestic and international matters, as well as the presumption 
of unfettered state sovereignty, it suggested, simply did not exist 
anymore. 
Today the foreign policy of the United States is a 
declaration of the interdependence of men and nations. 
We now know, as Woodrow Wilson told us 34 years ago, 
that “we are participants, whether we would or not, in 
the life of the world. The interests of all nations are our 
own also. We are partners with the rest. What affects 
mankind is inevitably our affair as well as the affair of 
Europe and Asia.”26 
It was not by chance that drafters of the Report invoked the 
words of former President Wilson. Though Wilson spoke those 
words during World War I with the hope of creating a “League” 
that would help develop a lasting peace and ensure friendly 
relations among the nations of the world, the international 
commitment to do so fell apart before the necessary institutional 
conditions could be achieved.27 In particular, a strong group of 
isolationists within the United States Senate objected to joining 
the League of Nations.28 Without the United States’ 
participation, the organization was doomed from the start and 
 
 24. Id. at 4. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 99–100. 
 27. See JOHN MILTON COOPER, JR., BREAKING THE HEART OF THE WORLD: 
WOODROW WILSON AND THE FIGHT FOR THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS 55–108 (2001). 
 28. See, e.g., id. at 55 (explaining that the opposition was led by senator 
Henry Cabot Lodge and the republican leadership at the time). 
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soon the world descended into war once again. Nevertheless, 
even after another World War, a strong contingent of 
isolationists remained in Congress. Because they continued to 
object to the constraints, obligations, and outlays that an 
internationalist agenda would impose on the United States, the 
exhortations within Truman’s foreign policy report sought to 
make the case that there was no longer any political position 
that could be legitimately be called “isolationism.”29 
International politics were already part of domestic politics, and 
vice versa—even in the area of how a nation treated its 
citizens.30 Thus as early as 1950, political leaders in the United 
States had begun to articulate a vision of policy that prioritized 
the application of international principles in domestic law. But 
even the strongest interpretation of this policy did not bind the 
domestic actions of the United States in a way an enforceable 
human rights treaty might. 
Although the State Department recognized that one nation’s 
treatment of its own citizens was a valid concern for all, it also 
recognized that actually instituting the idea and establishing 
the requisite political and legal institutions was nothing short of 
revolutionary. The same foreign policy report conceded: 
The drafting of human-rights covenants is one of the 
boldest as well as one of the most difficult projects ever 
conceived by a group of nations. In the judgment of 
history, this quiet and generally unsung work may rank 
as one of the great revolutionary enterprises of the 
United Nations.31 
Several months before the UDHR would be completed and 
adopted by the General Assembly, in August of 1948, a State 
Department official wrote of the dramatic nature of the 
Covenant in its public bulletin: 
The theory of the covenant in itself is revolutionary: an 
undertaking by international treaty to insure certain 
rights which have traditionally been regarded as being 
solely of national concern. A sufficient impetus has been 
created in the Commission for the completion of a 
 
 29. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, OFFICE OF PUB. AFF., supra note 22, at 16. 
 30. See id. at 98–99 (discussing the universality of human rights and its 
presence in the United States from the inception of the country). 
 31. Id. at 98. 
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covenant, on the basis of a sincere desire to avoid 
catastrophes such as those launched by Hitler in his 
persecution of the Jews, and to improve the standards of 
international human rights in a field which appears to 
many to be more important than the ever expanding field 
of science. But this impetus may be lost if the initial 
program is too ambitious. To allow an individual to 
appeal from a decision of his country’s court of last resort 
is a serious step; yet this might be the consequence of 
recognizing the right of individual petition.32 
During this period, in fact, a number of commentators 
underscored the manifest challenges associated with the new 
human rights project by conceding its revolutionary nature. 
After the UN Charter was complete, and just as the UDHR and 
Covenant were underway, even the most dedicated human 
rights advocates at the time spoke with a mix of hope and 
uncertainty about its radical nature. For example, John 
Humphrey, the Canadian legal scholar responsible for the initial 
draft of the UDHR, commented during a gathering of academics: 
[L]et us not be blind to the difficulties. What the United 
Nations is trying to do is revolutionary in character. 
Human rights are largely a matter of relationships 
between the state and individuals, and therefore a 
matter which has been traditionally regarded as being 
within the domestic jurisdiction of states. What is now 
being proposed is, in effect, the creation of some kind of 
supranational supervision of this relationship between 
the state and its citizens.33 
In 1948, the renowned scholar of human rights and 
international law, Hersch Lauterpacht, offered a similar 
appraisal of what he believed was an “almost revolutionary” 
development within the law.34 Lauterpacht’s use of the word 
revolutionary, however, was not based on the mere possibility of 
incorporating international law into domestic law. Unlike the 
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State Department and Humphrey, he was referring to an actual 
instance in which the Supreme Court of the United States 
seemed to be bringing homeward the international human rights 
provisions in the UN Charter. In Hurd v. Hodge, Lauterpacht 
wrote, “the Supreme Court of the United States, by way of a 
novel and almost revolutionary interpretation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the Constitution . . . stated, without referring 
expressly to the Charter, that prohibition of discrimination was 
now—by reason, inter alia, of treaties concluded by the United 
States—part of the public policy of its law.”35 
Thus, it appeared at the time that the principles contained 
within international human rights treaties were slowly being 
incorporated into the domestic political sphere. Despite the 
domestic emergence of international human rights principles, 
however, whether the new international idea of human rights 
would be truly revolutionary was still an open question; it 
depended on whether domestic law and domestic politics were 
amenable to incorporating international human rights law into 
their own framework. Again, this historical process is one of epic 
successes and momentous failures. Typically, the successes, 
rather than the failures, occupy the most prominent place in the 
history books.36 Yet, a historical understanding that is based 
solely—or even mostly—on historical successes and the laws, 
treaties, institutions, and ideas that survive into the present is 
a historical understanding that is incomplete. 
B. SENATOR JOHN BRICKER’S CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE 
Ohio Senator John Bricker’s efforts to restrict the treaty-
making provisions within the United States Constitution and 
the presidential powers surrounding executive agreements are 
some of the most well-known domestic episodes in the history of 
United States human rights and international law.37 Yet while 
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Bricker’s efforts have been well-documented by historians and 
human rights scholars, the broader context within which Bricker 
was operating has to date remained relatively unexplored.38 This 
section describes what is known about Bricker’s efforts to amend 
the Constitution and their lasting impact. In doing so, the 
section serves as a departure point for investigating who and 
what Bricker was fighting against—namely, other legal 
“failures,” often passed over by scholars—that nevertheless 
permanently altered the course of human rights in the United 
States. 
1. A Proposal to Amend the United States Constitution 
Bricker first spoke to his Senate colleagues in the summer 
and fall of 1951 about his proposed amendment to prevent the 
United States from entering into human rights agreements. His 
efforts were centered on the Covenant, a binding international 
human rights treaty then being drafted at the United Nations. 
Using his characteristic apocryphal rhetoric, he warned them 
that the Covenant “would permit the destruction of freedom of 
the press” and “could be used to destroy freedom of religion.”39 
During these early Senate debates, he drew a deep political line 
around the issue with the suggestion that “no patriotic American 
will be able to support the United Nations if it continues to 
threaten national sovereignty by claiming jurisdiction over 
fundamental human rights. Those who encourage the UN’s 
treaty-making ambitions are the UN’s worst enemies.”40 In 
September 1951 Bricker called the Covenant “a trap for the 
liberties of the American people” endorsed by a State 
Department that was bent upon creating a “world 
government.”41 
Scholars have extensively studied the events surrounding 
the Bricker amendment controversy during the 1950s to 
determine the reason Bricker led this multi-year crusade 
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against human rights treaties.42 It is well known now that 
Bricker was concerned with a number of things that related to 
human rights treaties. For example, given the geopolitical 
climate at the time, Bricker often claimed that being obligated 
to follow international human rights treaties would subject 
Americans to communist influence within domestic law.43 
Similarly, Bricker argued that human rights treaties would 
diminish the Constitutional protections and basic rights 
afforded to American citizens.44 Another common bundle of 
arguments Bricker offered was that human rights treaties would 
infringe on domestic jurisdiction, states’ rights, and of course the 
limiting of national sovereignty.45 
An examination of the initial resolutions Bricker submitted 
in the Senate, along with the arguments he raised when 
speaking on the Senate floor, provides support for these themes 
that are the mainstay of the Bricker story to date. On July 17, 
1951, Bricker submitted Senate Resolution 177 (“S. Res. 177”), 
the first of many resolutions.46 Although S. Res. 177 was only a 
hortatory statement, it clearly outlined the general nature of his 
grievances with human rights treaties as well as the course of 
action he would take in subsequent years. The text read: 
Resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate that– 
1. the Draft International Covenant on Human Rights, 
as revised by the United Nations Commission on Human 
Rights at its seventh session, would, if ratified as a 
treaty, prejudice those rights of the American people 
which are now protected by the bill of rights of the 
Constitution of the United States; 
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2. the President of the United States should advise the 
United Nations that the proposed International 
Covenant on Human Rights is not acceptable to the 
United States; and 
3. the President of the United States should instruct 
United States representatives at the United Nations to 
withdraw from further negotiations with respect to the 
Covenant on Human Rights, and all other covenants, 
treaties, and conventions which seek to prescribe 
restrictions on individual liberty which, if passed by the 
Congress as domestic legislation, would be 
unconstitutional.47  
For Bricker, the Covenant was the embodiment of an 
internationalist agenda that sought to integrate international 
institutions and laws with domestic institutions and laws in the 
United States. His solution was to urge the Senate and the 
American public to pressure the Truman administration to halt 
its participation not only in the ongoing drafting of the 
Covenant, but all future human rights projects at the United 
Nations.48 
If the text of the resolution left anything to the imagination 
of his Senate colleagues, Bricker quickly put to rest any question 
about his intentions regarding the Covenant specifically, and 
international human rights treaties generally: 
I have submitted this afternoon for appropriate reference 
a simple resolution declaring it to be the sense of the 
Senate that the proposed covenant on human rights be 
not approved, and that negotiations with respect thereto 
by representatives of the United States be terminated. 
My purpose in offering this resolution is to bury the so-
called covenant on human rights so deep that no one 
holding high public office will ever dare to attempt its 
resurrection.49 
Bricker was not one to hold back his vitriol or hyperbole. He 
went on to suggest that the Covenant would better be called the 
 
 47. Id. 
 48. See 97 CONG. REC. 8254 (1951). 
 49. Id. at 8263. 
18 MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT'L LAW [Vol. 26:1 
“Covenant on Human Slavery or subserviency to government.”50 
This treaty, he continued was a “monstrous document” that 
amounted to nothing more than a “blueprint for slavery.”51 For 
Bricker, this kind of charged rhetoric when he submitted his 
resolutions was quite common; he often conducted lengthy and 
impassioned floor discussions to explain the purpose of his 
legislative proposals.52 
Another of Bricker’s primary concerns was that 
international human rights treaties would require the cession of 
United States sovereignty. Though Article 2(7) of the UN 
Charter reaffirmed the sovereignty of nations, the human rights 
provisions contained within the Charter explicitly introduced 
the idea that domestic issues had international ramifications, 
thereby putting into question the true extent and limits of state 
sovereignty.53 Throughout his battle, Bricker warned lawmakers 
and the American public not to surrender their sovereignty. For 
example, in one Senate speech he said: “No nation has any real 
sovereignty if the economic and political rights which it extends 
to its people are subject to recognition, modification and review 
by an international authority.”54 In another speech he spoke in 
sweeping terms about the danger of relinquishing national 
sovereignty: “[T]he paramount issue of our time is whether or 
not the sovereignty and the Constitution of the United States 
shall be preserved. Because of a constitutional loophole which I 
shall discuss, it is possible for the sovereignty and the 
independence of the United States to be surrendered by 
treaty.”55 Indeed, the fear of losing the nation’s sovereignty to 
international human rights was a central issue for Bricker for 
years to come. 
Bricker submitted his next resolution two months later, in 
September 1951. Unlike his previous resolution, this was not 
simply a hortatory resolution intended to indicate a political 
mood within the Senate. Instead, this resolution, Senate Joint 
Resolution 102 (“S.J. Res. 102”), was the first official version of 
his many subsequent resolutions that called for the amendment 
of the United States Constitution.56 Similar to his earlier Senate 
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discussion, the discussion that he offered the Senate in support 
of S.J. Res. 102 also contained a number of the themes that had 
been outlined in historical scholarship on Bricker. For example, 
he spoke at length about how the Covenant on Human Rights 
would diminish constitutional protections that were afforded to 
American citizens and would infringe on the nation’s 
sovereignty. The State Department, he argued, “was forced to 
choose between the Constitution and national sovereignty on the 
one hand and the prospect of achieving in the future a world 
government. The State Department chose world government.”57 
He continued: “The Covenant on Human Rights is a trap for the 
liberties of the American people.”58 And of course, much of his 
discussion was suffused with anti-communist, Cold War 
rhetoric. He warned that a “majority of the U.N. members are 
nations which have succumbed to communism, socialism, or 
some form of dictatorial rule. The common characteristic of all 
these countries is that they exalt the power of the state over the 
individual.”59 Thus, it was as clear to his contemporaries as it is 
to historians today that one of Bricker’s main goals was to 
prevent the integration of international human rights principles 
into domestic law. 
2. Influence of Senator Bricker’s Amendment 
Within historical literature, the consensus regarding 
Senator Bricker’s influence is clear: though unsuccessful in 
amending the Constitution, the threat of an amendment was 
extremely influential with respect to shaping the United States’ 
participation at the United Nations on human rights issues and 
treaty-making, as well as its foreign and domestic policies 
regarding human rights.60 Specifically, it caused the Eisenhower 
Administration to take actions that set a course for decades to 
come. 
By the spring of 1953, the domestic political pressures had 
mounted upon the Eisenhower Administration. A February 1953 
State Department memo summed up the administration’s 
concern over Bricker’s actions: 
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The Covenants are under attack by large and important 
groups in this country such as the American Bar 
Association and a number of members of the U.S. Senate. 
For the administration to press ahead with the 
Covenants would tend to keep alive and strengthen 
support for the Bricker amendments to the 
Constitution.61  
The coalition spearheaded by Bricker was strong enough to 
compel the Eisenhower Administration to back away from 
committing to the Covenants, originally intended to be the teeth 
of international human rights agreements. The President chose 
to quit the Covenant, which had by this time been split into two 
documents.62 Under President Eisenhower, the State 
Department set forth its new plan: the United States would not 
attempt to ratify the Covenants, but it would continue to take 
part in their drafting.63 
As Henkin argues, the long-term effects of Bricker’s 
agitation were profound.64 This episode showed that there would 
be a political cost for supporting human rights treaties. As a 
result, elected representatives began to tread very carefully, if 
at all, when offering their support for such treaties. Legally, this 
qualified support took the form of addenda to international 
treaties, which stated that such treaties would have no domestic 
effect. Such practices have continued into the present day. The 
United States, upon signing and ratifying human rights treaties, 
always includes “legal footnotes” called reservations, 
understandings, and declarations (“RUD”s). These are 
statements that range from merely voicing opinion to completely 
negating entire portions of the treaty.65 
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3. Scholarly Blind Spots in the Bricker Controversy 
Ironically, a scholar studying the three foundational human 
rights texts—the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(“ICCPR”), and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, 
and Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”)—will find little if any direct 
evidence of Bricker’s impact (or even his existence). Nor is there 
any evidence of Bricker’s proposed amendment in the United 
States Constitution or domestic case law. The Bricker 
controversy thus draws attention to what is a major issue for 
scholarship that seeks to trace the origins of the modern 
international human rights regime: a case that was overruled or 
proposed legislation that never became law still can exert a 
dramatic influence on subsequent laws and policies. 
Although much has been written about the Bricker 
Amendment controversy, there are a number of crucial matters 
scholars have failed to investigate, such as: Who exactly was 
Bricker arguing against? Why did he need to assemble such a 
massive coalition? What ideas, laws, and movements was he 
fighting against? The result is that we have only a very partial 
knowledge of the historical circumstances surrounding Senator 
Bricker’s actions. Much is known about Bricker’s actions and the 
content of his proposals, yet the broader context surrounding his 
campaign to amend the Constitution have thus far remained 
hidden from view. 
In particular, the questions posed above relate to what were 
Bricker’s “aversive alternatives.”66 That is, what threats, 
whether real or imagined, was he fighting against?67 By 
assuming that the entire episode was at least in part reactive, it 
is possible to trace back in time the nature and influence of those 
institutions, laws, organizations, and ideas that are no longer 
with us, but nevertheless significantly shaped contemporary 
practices, institutions and outcomes.68 Such a priori 
assumptions raise new questions and set the research on a new 
course into uncharted historical territory in search of Bricker’s 
causal antecedents. It is not enough to simply ask what Bricker 
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was fighting for; it is also essential to also ask what and who he 
was fighting against. 
Specifically, it is necessary to ask who was responsible for 
promoting the alternative version(s) of human rights that John 
Bricker opposed. As it turns out, scholars generally have not 
followed these important historical leads that are actually 
displayed quite prominently in the primary source materials. 
Throughout his speeches and writings, Bricker made it a point 
to broadcast who he was fighting against; for example, aiming at 
President Truman and a number of people within his 
administration who were actively involved in the creation of the 
Covenant on Human Rights.69 Similarly, he accused Attorney 
General McGrath of misleading the American people through his 
assurances that the Covenant did not “weaken the protection of 
freedoms secured by the Bill of Rights.”70 He suggested that the 
President, the State Department, and the United States 
representatives to the United Nations had been working under 
the influence of communist nations and their ideas.71 He singled 
out both State Department officials and representatives to the 
United Nations, such as Dean Acheson,72 Eleanor Roosevelt,73 
and her advisor at the State Department, James Pomeroy 
Hendrick, as being intent on subverting the constitutional rights 
of Americans.74 
Yet while Bricker spent a great deal of time attacking 
President Truman and members of his administration, in his 
initial Senate debates he devoted far more time to attacking 
three law professors: Harvard Law Professor Zechariah Chafee, 
Robert Hutchins of the University of Chicago, and Columbia 
University’s Philip C. Jessup.75 Bricker devoted significant time 
to attacking Chafee and his involvement with a report on 
freedom of the press that was drafted by a group headed by 
Hutchins.76 He went to great lengths to discredit the views of 
Jessup, mentioning him at least twenty times in one Senate 
debate.77 Bricker also mentioned, time and time again, a man 
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named Sei Fujii.78 Who were these people and what alternative 
visions of human rights did they represent? These new lines of 
inquiry that take the historical analysis in exciting new 
directions are based on a basic, though often neglected, fact—
people, ideas, and laws that no longer possess clear relevance or 
direct import for contemporary observers might have been 
supremely influential in their day.79 
The next two sections of this Article prioritize asking what 
particular concepts, such as human rights, mean within the 
historical context under consideration. Although the brief 
foregoing analysis of Bricker’s crusade seems to confirm much of 
what is already known about the history, it also raises several 
questions that scholars have not yet asked. Specifically, who was 
promoting the alternative conception of human rights Bricker 
fought against? Bricker often used a number of somewhat 
unfamiliar terms in his discussions of the United Nations and 
the Human Rights Covenant. For instance, throughout his 
Senate debates, he devoted significant time to discussing the 
dangers of “world government.”80 He spoke about the idealistic 
and naïve “one-worlders,” and he excoriated those who 
advocated for a “world Bill of Rights.”81 What do these terms 
refer to, and what do they suggest about the broader historical 
context? 
What is particularly notable is the fact that Bricker 
maintained his focus on the Fujii case (discussed in the following 
Section), continued to fight against “world government” 
advocates, and discredited the work of Jessup, Hutchins and 
Chafee simultaneously.82 Kaufman and Whiteman (1988) show 
that in 1953 the amount of time Bricker devoted to the 
discussion of world government in the Senate exceeded the 
amount of time he spent discussing the threat of communism, 
human rights infringing on domestic law, or the threat human 
rights posed to democracy.83 The topic of Sei Fujii, world 
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government, and the views of these professors, in fact, take up 
such a significant part of Bricker’s public speaking life that they 
demand at least some investigation to figure out exactly what 
these concepts meant to Bricker and why he was so persistent in 
his attacks. 
In the standard Bricker story, historians either do not pick 
up on his mention of Sei Fujii or his “world government” and 
“world constitution” language, or presume that Bricker is simply 
talking about the United Nations and international human 
rights treaties. In fact, what he spoke of was quite different.84 
Bricker did not just look forward to what would happen with 
future covenants and human rights treaties; he also looked back 
at what had happened already and reacted to very recent 
developments, movements, and trends that were at the time 
raw, well-known, and widely discussed.85 Because many such 
references have been overruled, discredited, and forgotten, 
however, scholars have not integrated them fully into the history 
of human rights in the United States. The next two parts of this 
Article bring this neglected historical context into view by 
exploring who Sei Fujii and Robert Hutchins were, what “world 
government” was, and what each represented in Bricker’s 
struggle.86 
II. AN OVERRULED CASE 
Today, courts in the United States do not consider the 
validity of domestic laws in light of international human rights 
treaties.87 This was not always the case. In 1950, a California 
appellate decision named the human rights provisions in the UN 
Charter as the supreme law of the land, thereby invalidating a 
California law that prevented Japanese residents from owning 
land.88 The Fujii case, as it came to be known, initiated a 
political firestorm.89 Two years later, the California Supreme 
Court forever wiped the decision from the books.90 
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Although there is little direct evidence in existing law of 
what is now a legal nullity, the case represented a sharp turning 
point in the domestic history of human rights. Following the 
Fujii case, what had become an increasingly common practice—
citing international human rights provisions in domestic 
cases91—soon halted. The case lit a fire for Senator Bricker’s 
opposition.92 The domestic struggle over Fujii helped translate, 
and therefore define, what human rights were and what they 
would be for the American public.93 
A. THE FUJII CASE OF 1950 
During the late 1940s and early 1950s, many indicators 
pointed to the fact that domestic courts and aggrieved parties 
were considering whether and how the provisions of the UN 
Charter related to domestic laws and policies within the United 
States. Between 1948 and 1955, there were a number of 
Supreme Court cases in which the Court, parties’ briefs, or 
amicus briefs, referenced the United Nations Charter in such 
discussions.94 Similarly, during this period, the same thing 
began to appear in state court cases in the United States. Many 
of those who had suffered what they perceived to be harms 
started looking towards international law as a moral 
touchstone—if not legal authority—for shaping the domestic 
law. In a series of state-level cases, for instance, the court 
discussed the Charter or the issues surrounding the use of the 
Charter within the domestic context.95 Only one of these cases, 
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however—the 1950 Fujii case—actually invalidated a domestic 
law.96 
The Fujii case involved the inability of Japanese residents 
to own land in California.97 Sei Fujii was a resident of California 
who, because of existing immigration and naturalization laws, 
could not become an American citizen on account of his Japanese 
ancestry.98 Thus, the California Alien Land Law prohibited him 
from ever owning land in the State.99 After his legal challenge to 
the Alien Land Law was defeated in the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County, Fujii appealed.100 On appeal, the court decided 
to invalidate California’s Alien Land Law based on a novel—
perhaps “revolutionary”—theory of law that integrated U.S. 
Constitutional provisions with international law and domestic 
state law.101 
Citing Article VI, Section 2 of the United States 
Constitution, the court maintained that the Charter—a valid 
treaty—was, under the supremacy clause, “now the supreme law 
of the land.”102 Once the court had established the UN Charter 
as governing law, it spelled out the implications that required 
that, “every State in the Union accept and act upon the Charter 
according to its plain language and its unmistakable purpose 
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and intent.”103 The plain language in Articles 55 and 56 of the 
Charter, the court argued, were entirely clear: 
It is agreed in Chapter IX, Article 55, that ‘the United 
Nations shall promote . . . universal respect for, and 
observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms 
for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or 
religion.’ By Article 56 it is declared that ‘All Members 
pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in 
cooperation with the Organization for the achievement of 
the purposes set forth in Article 55.’104 
Ultimately, the court held that the provisions within the Alien 
Land Law were in “direct conflict with the plain terms of the 
Charter.”105 
Clearly such a discrimination against a people of one race 
is contrary both to the letter and to the spirit of the 
Charter which, as a treaty, is paramount to every law of 
every state in conflict with it. The Alien Land Laws must 
therefore yield to the treaty as the superior authority. 
The restrictions of the statute based on eligibility to 
citizenship, but which ultimately and actually are 
referable to race or color, must be and are therefore 
declared untenable and unenforceable.106  
Although this decision was overruled within two years, it 
stood for a dramatic proposition: the United States and its own 
domestic laws were bound by the international human rights 
provisions within the Charter.107 Even at this early stage—that 
is, before the binding Covenant had been completed—the brief 
human rights provisions within the Charter were now to be 
counted, at least by this California court, as the supreme law of 
the land.108 
What was actually a short and straightforward opinion set 
off a firestorm in the United States, and it is at this point in the 
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story that Senator John Bricker becomes important.109 The 
struggle over what this case represented was an extremely 
important, defining moment in the post-World War II history of 
international human rights.110 Historical literature focuses on 
the orientation of Bricker’s actions toward mitigating future 
effects of the Covenant and other human rights treaties.111 This 
is absolutely true. But as the Fujii case makes clear, Bricker was 
also reacting to a series of events that already had been set in 
motion by the early 1950s. 
It was not merely the laws that Bricker worried were taking 
hold; it was the perceived—and perhaps growing—legitimacy of 
using international human rights ideas within the domestic 
setting. The fact that judges were even discussing the merits of 
the domestic use of international human rights law was in fact 
a major problem for Bricker. And even if Fujii was the only case 
that had up until that moment been willing to use international 
human rights law to invalidate a domestic law, it was a sign of 
a possible shift, one that could make significant progress toward 
defining the domestic acceptance of human rights even before 
the Covenant was completed. If other courts, for instance, 
followed the Fujii Court’s interpretation of international human 
rights law, so too might public opinion, domestic legislation, and 
institutional structures.112 Bricker was therefore not just 
looking forward, but was reacting to events that had already 
transpired. 
The goal of Bricker and others like him was to discredit this 
emergent notion of applying international human rights in the 
domestic context, while impugning its advocates, gathering 
supporters, and creating a legal bulwark against the domestic 
impact of international human rights law. Thus, when Bricker 
spoke to the United States Senate about loss of sovereignty, his 
arguments were not abstract or hypothetical. Rather, they were 
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focused on a specific series of events that had transpired over the 
past several years. In particular, Bricker made it quite clear that 
the Fujii case was a primary concern during his Congressional 
statements, stating: “I do not agree that the determination of the 
court in the Fujii case is a proper judicial decision.”113 
Bricker’s solution was to create a legal blockade against 
international human rights law with his constitutional 
amendment. In February 1952, for instance, when discussing his 
own Senate Joint Resolution 130 (“S.J. Res. 130”), he described 
the purpose of the amendment with explicit reference to the 
Fujii case.114 He explained that in Fujii “a California court held 
that the State’s Alien Land Law was repealed by article 55 of the 
UN Charter.”115 Thus, he continued, one of the chief purposes of 
S.J. Res. 130 was to “prevent treaties from automatically 
becoming the supreme law of the land and thereby nullifying an 
indeterminable amount of Federal and State legislation without 
further action by the Congress.”116 While much of the talk of the 
effect of international human rights law had been speculative, 
Fujii provided Bricker with a tangible example of what might 
happen in the United States if the trend towards incorporation 
continued. 
B. FUJII AND LOCAL HUMAN RIGHTS STRUGGLES 
One crucial, and often overlooked, aspect of this history is 
that the issue of human rights is not merely an international 
issue. Human rights are necessarily and simultaneously a 
domestic concern.117 The Fujii case shows that the struggles over 
international human rights actually pertain to existing and 
future domestic concerns. In the early 1950s both sides of the 
human rights debate had significant stakes in the outcomes 
regarding whether international human rights would be 
incorporated into the domestic law.118 Thus, establishing a 
lasting conception of human rights as domestic law had just as 
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many political consequences for those aggrieved parties and 
individuals who had been seeking its admittance as it did for the 
future of those who were actively fighting against it. Though 
often overlooked, this domestic aspect of human rights—even 
their domestic rejection—is an integral part of the human rights 
concept formation process. 
Bricker, for instance, argued a great deal about the loss of 
sovereignty.119 In the abstract, however, sovereignty does not 
offer much analytic purchase for understanding the particular 
situation in question. The real question for Bricker—and what 
was so deeply troubling to him—was not simply the necessity of 
relinquishing sovereignty under an international system of 
human rights, but it was the question of who would be bound 
and by what authority.120 He maintained: 
The basic premise of the so-called new international law 
is that the relationship between citizens of the same 
government and between the individual and his 
government are appropriate subjects for negotiation, 
definition, and enforcement in multilateral treaties. 
Under this theory of the function of international law, no 
economic or political rights are beyond the reach of the 
treaty-making power.121  
In this regard, the relation that human rights implied 
between the domestic and international realms was of great 
concern. Seizing upon the language of the State Department’s 
reports, Bricker turned the government’s language around for 
his own argument that the State Department was “promoting 
this revolutionary legal theory by statements that the distinction 
between foreign and domestic affairs is virtually nonexistent.”122 
A close read of Bricker’s arguments is particularly 
illuminating in showing just how locally-driven his arguments 
about human rights and sovereignty actually were. “If the Fujii 
case should eventually be affirmed by the United States 
Supreme Court,” Bricker warned, “literally thousands of Federal 
and State laws will automatically become invalid.”123 If human 
rights treaties were incorporated into domestic law, he 
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continued, the nation might be forced “to provide equal rights for 
women. Obviously, something must be done to prevent treaties 
from having such far-reaching and unintended consequences.”124 
Of course, such consequences of incorporating human rights law 
into domestic law were fully intended by many who had failed to 
achieve the justice they felt they deserved under the United 
States Constitution. A brief look at the kinds of social issues at 
stake in the cases in which plaintiffs had looked toward 
international human rights law, for instance, shows a series of 
ongoing battles over local legal issues, such as anti-
miscegenation laws, racially restrictive covenants, and alien 
land ownership laws.125 
Bricker was quite correct about the necessity of having to 
relinquish a certain amount of sovereignty if international 
human rights were to be admitted into domestic law. Although 
Bricker and others thought this was one of the worst things that 
could happen to the American republic, as a practical matter, the 
necessity of relinquishing a certain amount of freedom when 
creating new laws is entirely unremarkable. Just as business 
regulations and criminal laws limit the freedom to pollute or 
commit murder, for instance, human rights laws similarly must 
restrict certain conduct if they are to work. Bricker warned 
about the effects of accepting a domestic notion of human rights 
by offering specific examples of the local social consequences.126 
Exaggeration, fabrication, and scare tactics were common in his 
impassioned rhetoric. He claimed that international human 
rights would suppress or deny Americans the freedom of 
religion, the right to a public trial, freedom of speech, 
association, and “the right of the United States to protect itself 
against the subversive activities of Communists.”127 
Bricker’s inflammatory rhetoric was effective. Many citizens 
who were already invested in various local political battles took 
naturally and rapidly to Senator Bricker’s call to arms and 
became his allies.128 Human rights, though initiating from 
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international texts, appeared to them as just another local 
threat to the local battles they were fighting. While these 
struggles spurred some Americans to look toward human rights 
for relief, others took it upon themselves to prevent human 
rights from reaching domestic shores.129 By the early 1950s, 
completely wiping human rights treaties off the books was not 
possible—the United Nations had made too much progress and 
had too much forward momentum at this point to halt it. Thus 
the only option for domestic opponents of human rights was to 
define them for the American public in a way that was as 
consistent as possible with their local-level political aims and 
goals. 
C. THE RELEVANCE OF FUJII FOR SENATOR BRICKER 
The legal and political aspects of the Bricker episode are 
extremely important pieces of the overall story of human rights 
concept formation in the United States. But the Fujii case helps 
to illustrate the broader consequences of this episode in terms of 
the development of the United States’ contemporary domestic 
conception of human rights. Bricker and his allies were not just 
fighting against the Covenant or for a Constitutional 
amendment; they were fighting for a lasting conception of 
human rights for the United States—one that would continue to 
do Bricker’s work long after he and the particulars of the 
struggle were forgotten. The Fujii case helps illuminate this 
aspect of the story because what was at stake was whether rights 
would flow into the United States from the international realm. 
Bricker was fighting for an international-only conception of 
human rights in which rights could flow from the United States 
into the international realm, he argued, but not the other way 
around.130 
Although we know Bricker opposed human rights treaties, 
it is incorrect to say he opposed human rights. Senator Bricker, 
in fact, on numerous occasions advocated strongly on behalf of 
“human rights.”131 But as the following quotes show, his brand 
of human rights was quite different than that which was 
embodied within the Covenant on Human Rights. In July 1951 
he said on the floor of the Senate: 
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Our constant effort . . . ought to be to lift the other 
peoples of the world up to our high standard of individual 
human rights, rather than in any way to qualify our 
standard, or to agree with any position which other 
governments might take, or seek to have us take which 
have the effect of lowering it.132  
For Bricker, human rights sprang from the United States 
Constitution, not an international treaty. He argued that it 
would be possible for the United States to “play a leading part in 
advancing the cause of human rights all over the world.”133 But 
those human rights, as far as he was concerned, had to originate 
within the Constitution.134 Within his understanding of the 
matter, the slightest departure from the Constitution made any 
external human rights treaty null and void. 
We should try to convince the other nations of the world 
that neither communism nor socialism is the wave of the 
future . . . we should try to spread the doctrine that 
human rights can be achieved only by adhering to the 
principles embodied in the Constitution of the United 
States and in the Declaration of Independence. By 
precept and example we strengthen ourselves and can 
best guide others to nobler concepts of human rights.135 
A key insight emerges: Bricker actually supported human 
rights, though a version of human rights that originated within 
the provisions of the Constitution and emanated out, beyond the 
borders of the United States rather than the other way around. 
Thus, Bricker was not against human rights, but was fighting 
for a particular conception of them. The meaning of human 
rights for the present and future generations was what was at 
stake within the context of this struggle. To the extent that we, 
in the present, fail to appreciate the historical origins of our own 
contemporary human rights concept, it is quite possible that we 
might become unwitting collaborators of those who invented it 
in the past. 
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III. A VANQUISHED SOCIAL MOVEMENT 
For those studying the history of human rights, it is easy to 
let characters such as Senator John Bricker take control of the 
story. Bricker was a larger than life individual with missionary 
zeal, legions of supporters, great power, and outsized influence 
over public matters. But focusing on his personality and 
biographical details is not particularly useful for answering the 
broad questions about contemporary conceptions of human 
rights in the United States. Instead, it is more useful to focus on 
what Bricker represented in context. That is, it is important to 
focus the inquiry on examining the particular historical setting 
that informed the ideas and proposals that Bricker put forth; to 
consider the structural conditions that enabled him to gain such 
support at the time; and to use his story to learn about this 
extremely unique and defining moment in United States history. 
One topic of debate that was raised repeatedly by Senator 
Bricker was the threat of something he called “world 
government.” To Bricker, the Covenant, human rights treaties, 
Fujii, and the United Nations were each part of a scheme for 
world government. “According to this scheme,” Bricker argued, 
“we are to be a state in a great nation of states, with our destiny 
not shaped by ourselves, but by a super government.”136 The 
inflammatory nature of Bricker’s rhetoric is clear in the 
statements he used to describe world government: 
Our Government, our educational system, our trade and 
commerce, our own domestic laws, the control of our 
Armies, Navies, and Air Forces are to be given 
completely to this super-world-government, all in the 
name of preserving peace. Is that the kind of peace the 
builders of this great Nation want? Is peace so sweet that 
we are willing to be made slaves in order to obtain it?137  
Interestingly, his accusations were not strictly partisan. He 
explained in his speech to the Senate that both “Republicans and 
Democrats are included among those who would convert the 
United Nations into an instrument of world government by the 
use of treaties.”138 
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Bricker’s answer to the impending threat of world 
government, of course, was his Constitutional amendment. 
Before the United States “is engulfed by some form of world or 
regional government,” Bricker warned, “the American people 
must, admittedly, take that revolutionary step, by amending the 
Constitution.”139 Though Bricker did not shy away from scare 
tactics, looking back at this history from our own contemporary 
perspective it is difficult to know where his embellishments end 
and the truth begins. After all, the phrase “world government” 
means far less, if anything, to us today than it did in the post-
World War II context. This section places Bricker’s rhetoric 
about world government in its context and explores the 
constellation of proposed ideas, laws, and institutions 
surrounding the overlooked and unsuccessful, yet highly 
influential, world government movement. 
A. CHANCELLOR HUTCHINS AND A PLAN FOR WORLD 
GOVERNMENT 
When Bricker first submitted S. Res. 177 in July 1951, he 
lambasted a report on freedom of the press that was authored by 
Chancellor Robert Hutchins of the University of Chicago.140 
Hutchins was a public figure in American politics, public affairs, 
and academia who was at the time well known in popular 
conversation.141 Hutchins was not one to retreat from potential 
controversy; in fact, he preferred to author it. Hutchins headed 
a commission that had been created to study the issue of freedom 
of the press. The Commission of Freedom of the Press (“the 
Commission”) was well-appointed in funds and in notable public 
figures. The Commission’s Report was financed with grants of 
$200,000 from Time, Inc. and $15,000 from Encyclopedia 
Britannica, Inc.142 These, of course, were extremely significant 
figures for any such endeavor, but particularly so for a project 
that was primarily academic in nature. 
Many of the notable public figures who joined Hutchins on 
the Commission worked in political posts and for causes that 
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Bricker opposed.143 Some Commission members, for example, 
had been part of Franklin Roosevelt’s administration. For 
instance, Archibald Macleish was an American member of 
UNESCO’s governing board, and was responsible for writing the 
preamble to its 1945 Constitution.144 Several years earlier, he 
directed the Office of Facts and Figures (later the Office of War 
Information), and was appointed by Franklin Roosevelt to chair 
a committee charged with outlining his Four Freedoms in 
1942145—a precursor idea to human rights that appears in the 
UDHR’s preamble.146 In this latter task, Macleish was joined by 
another Commission member, Reinhold Niebuhr. Additional 
members of the Commission, such as Zechariah Chafee and 
Jacques Maritain, worked and advocated for the UN and human 
rights.147 
But what is most noteworthy, and directly relates to the 
context of Bricker’s fierce rhetoric surrounding world 
government, is the fact that there were a number of individuals 
on the Commission who had been arguing that the United 
Nations was not strong enough or acceptable in its then-present 
form.148 Although Bricker made similar arguments, these 
individuals had a very different solution. Instead of relying on 
the United Nations to attain and preserve international peace 
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and security, these Commission members advocated disbanding 
the United Nations and creating a stronger, truly supranational 
from of government. For example, Beardsley Ruml, who was 
Chairman of the Board of the department store R.H. Macy and 
Company and had been the Chairman of the Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York, was a strong advocate of such a plan.149 
Other Commission members were members of another 
Committee that Hutchins headed, the Committee to Frame a 
World Constitution (the “Committee”). This second group was 
dedicated to researching, promoting, and enacting plans for 
what they called “world government”—the very same world 
government that Bricker was advocating against in the 
Senate.150 The Commission members who were or had been 
associated with the eleven-member Committee included Robert 
Redfield, William K. Hocking, Reinhold Niebuhr, and of course, 
Robert Hutchins, who was the head of both groups.151 
Hutchins’ Committee to Frame a World Constitution was 
responsible for publishing a monthly world government journal 
called Common Cause that by the end of 1951 had published over 
two thousand pages for its subscribers.152 But, more 
importantly, they were also responsible—and better known—for 
authoring a complex draft “World Constitution” that outlined in 
rich detail the institutional structure and composition of a new 
world order, as well as all of the associated rights and duties of 
the “world citizens” living beneath their invented system of 
global governance.153 It was this type of “world constitution” that 
Bricker spoke of at length in his congressional statements. 
Hutchins’ World Constitution (the “Chicago Plan”) 
contained a “Declaration of Duties and Rights” that included 
provisions for the stewardship of the “four elements of life—
earth, water, air, energy.”154 The Chicago Plan divided the world 
into “nine Societies of kindred nations and cultures, or 
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Regions . . . “ with names such as “Europa,” “Eurasia,” “Afrasia,” 
“Atlantis,” “Asia Major,” “Austrasia,” and “Columbia.”155 The 
World Constitution invalidated any region’s law that ran 
contrary to it.156 
Although Bricker did not mention it in his Senate speech, 
he undoubtedly would have been very much aware that 
Hutchins was intimately involved in the project to develop a 
world constitution. As described in detail below, it was a fact 
that had come up for discussion in many previous Senate and 
House debates.157 Nor would Bricker have needed to mention 
what was well known to his Senate colleagues: Hutchins’ plan 
for world government was but one of a great number of plans 
that advocated for restructuring the United Nations, or doing 
away with it altogether, and in its place instituting a world 
government. In the fall of 1951 several dozen of these plans had 
been drafted into resolutions and were awaiting their fate in the 
United States Congress.158 
As improbable as they seem today, all of these resolutions 
sought to transform the relationship the United States and its 
citizens held with the rest of the world, either by transforming 
the United Nations or through an entirely new supranational 
governmental institution. Doing so would require substantial 
reform and would require the United States to relinquish a 
major portion of its sovereignty. A number of the plans even 
called for amending the United States Constitution, though 
years before Bricker had put forth the idea for very different 
purposes.159 Although Bricker’s rhetoric today appears alarmist 
when placed in a contextual vacuum, for all of his liberal 
embellishments, Bricker actually downplayed the nature and 
extent of what was actually occurring at the time concerning the 
issue of world government. 
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B. NATIONAL POLITICAL SUPPORT FOR WORLD GOVERNMENT 
When Bricker introduced his resolutions in July and 
September of 1951, he was acting within a unique, though 
unstable, political and social context. Over the past several 
years, “world government” supporters had made a series of 
sweeping advances surrounding the question of how to organize 
the post-war world. They had, for instance, made significant 
inroads into all three branches of the United States’ federal 
government.160 For a number of years, Congress had been 
considering how to deal with a number of legislative proposals 
that advocated for various forms of world government or UN 
transformation.161 A reluctant and cautious Truman 
administration was also trying to figure out its path forward in 
the face of growing support for such ideas.162 The courts at this 
time also appeared to be moving towards ideas of international 
human rights law in a way that they had never before (or again) 
done. It is within this contextual backdrop of considerable 
national advances toward world government Bricker was 
operating. Because existing human rights scholarship has failed 
to account for much of the basic facts surrounding this historical 
episode, this Section offers a resource-rich outlay of historical 
data, providing extensive examples of the legislation, the 
politics, and the court cases that emerged. 
After 1945, a series of proposed laws and court cases had 
embraced the core idea of this budding internationalist trend 
that advocated for greater United States participation in global 
institutions and international sources of law. By 1948, a variety 
of individuals, groups, and organizations had advanced a wide 
range of often-revolutionary proposals; there were several dozen 
resolutions under consideration in the House of Representatives, 
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with many more in the works.163 Although many were similar to 
one another, there was also significant variation. The legislative 
proposals ranged from relatively modest suggestions to work 
within the confines of the United Nations to honor its core 
principles, to the amendment of the UN Charter to facilitate 
sweeping structural changes, to the wholesale rejection of the 
United Nations in place of a supranational so-called “world 
government” (see Table 1). In 1948, there was enough agitation 
and lobbying on the matter to gain the attention and support of 
a growing group of lawmakers in the House and Senate of the 
United States Congress.164 
By 1948, the issue of UN reform and world government had 
become prominent enough that the House Committee on Foreign 
Affairs held hearings on the matter in May 1948 to closely 
examine and consider the legislative proposals before it.165 The 
House Committee on Foreign Affairs again held hearings on the 
matter in October 1949.166 And after establishing a Senate 
Foreign Relations subcommittee on the “Revision of the United 
Nations Charter” to study the issue and examine the growing 
number of resolutions, the Senate subcommittee held its own 
hearings in February 1950.167 
An extraordinary amount of time and resources were 
focused on the hearings. Together, the hearings spanned nearly 
three weeks, during which time the House and Senate 
committees and subcommittees conducted interviews, heard oral 
testimony, and received written communication from over 351 
individuals and groups, amassing over 1,600 pages of 
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documentation.168 Several months after the Senate Hearings, 
the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations issued a sixty-four-
page report (the “Senate Report”) that provided a synthesis of 
the proposals as well as an overview of the 1950 hearings to 
assist lawmakers in their understanding of the issues and 
proposals before them.169 
The Senate Report recognized that in recent years there had 
been a “loss of confidence” in the UN from many quarters.170 
After World War II, the authors explained, achieving lasting 
international peace and security was of paramount concern.171 
In 1950, preventing another global war, of course, remained just 
as pressing a concern as ever, but the authors explained that in 
just a few years a number of momentous obstacles had emerged; 
the world in 1950 was quite different from the one that the 
architects of the UN had confronted in 1945.172 For one, the 
organization and its founding document—the UN Charter—
were both constructed before the public at large knew about 
atomic energy.173 The power that was unleashed over Japan in 
the waning days of World War II was an unforeseen 
technological development. In 1950, the Soviet Union possessed 
the same technology.174 At this point, the organization that the 
nations of the world had put their faith in for mitigating the 
threat of war did not possess the laws or mechanisms for 
controlling the proliferation and use of this potentially 
devastating weaponry.175 
The threat of atomic warfare was compounded by the 
political tensions that had emerged between the United States 
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and the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union’s repeated use of its veto 
in the Security Council brought to light the divergent—if not 
mutually exclusive—political interests of the two nations.176 It 
also prevented the United Nations from addressing and acting 
upon important international matters on its agenda. In these 
early days of the Cold War, the Senate Report acknowledged 
that the United Nations was an absolute necessity if the world 
was not to descend into anarchy.177 But at the same time, the 
Senate Report acknowledged that there were serious questions 
about whether the United Nations was strong enough to carry 
out the original mission its architects had set out for it—or 
whether the UN could even endure.178 Referencing the 
ideological nature of the Cold War, the authors of the Report 
wrote that the “positive advantages [of the UN] must, of course, 
be measured against the question as to how long the 
organization can survive the increasing pervasiveness and 
intensity of the ideological struggle for the minds and loyalties 
of men.”179 The challenges confronting the United Nations were 
formidable. 
The authors of the Senate Report wrote that it was obvious 
that there needed to be some kind of action or change by the UN 
to address these problems. Lawmakers, State Department 
officials, and engaged members of the public all recognized that 
business as normal at the UN could not be a lasting solution for 
international peace and security. The authors of the Senate 
Report wrote: “[T]he point does not need to be labored that the 
United States should do what it can to maintain and strengthen 
the United Nations.”180 Indeed, it was not just the United States 
that recognized these problems; those closest to the day-to-day 
political challenges within the UN also recognized the extent of 
its internal divisions. In 1948, for example, the UN’s own 
Secretary General, Trygve Lie, admitted that the “wartime 
alliance from which the United Nations was born started to pull 
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apart all too quickly and, had the establishment of the United 
Nations been delayed even a few months, the Organization 
might never have been created.”181 The most pressing question 
for United States lawmakers and State Department officials was 
what kind of institutional changes were necessary and 
appropriate. 
Until that time, the Truman administration and various 
members of Congress had begun to explore two very distinct 
paths for addressing the UN’s difficulties. The first was to work 
within the framework of the United Nations—though proposals 
differed on whether it was best to amend the Charter, and by 
extension the structure of the organization, or to leave it as it 
was. The second path, recognizing the deficiencies and inherent 
limitations of the UN, was to develop laws, international 
institutions, and relationships outside of the organization. The 
Vandenberg Resolution—a resolution that had already received 
a favorable reception in the Senate—recommended heading 
along both avenues simultaneously.182 It called not only for the 
United States to work within the framework of the United 
Nations to achieve peace, but also for regional security 
arrangements outside of the UN’s framework.183 
One-part idealism and one-part realism, the Vandenberg 
Resolution mirrored the uncertainty and the separate directions 
taken by the many competing legislative proposals then being 
considered. For the most part, though, these other proposals 
expanded liberally on each of the paths already taken by 
Vandenberg and his resolution’s supporters, offering to take the 
nation far afield of where it already was. It remained quite 
uncertain to all whether the best hopes for lasting international 
peace and security resided within the UN or in a separate 
institutional framework. 
The resolutions before Congress spanned a broad range.184 
There were, for instance, plans to strengthen the UN by altering 
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the rules surrounding the veto, by establishing armament 
regulations or security provisions.185 There were proposals to 
work outside of the United Nations to establish regional 
Unions,186 and finally there were many proposals that advocated 
the creation of a world government.187 
During each of the congressional hearings on UN reform 
and world government, the Truman administration sent 
representatives to testify before the congressional 
committees.188 In these hearings, the Truman administration 
quickly acknowledged there were a number of obstacles before 
the UN and its member states.189 It also recognized that there 
was significant interest among lawmakers and members of the 
American public about the matter, how to address it, and the 
sizeable consequences that resided with any course of action.190 
Secretary of State George C. Marshall said to the House 
Committee in May of 1948: 
The interest shown by the great majority of Americans 
in the United Nations and in increasing its effectiveness 
is an impressive fact. A vast amount of thought is being 
devoted throughout our country to means of furthering 
the objectives of the Charter in the prevailing world 
circumstances. The attitude of the United States towards 
the problems of the United Nations will have a profound 
effect on the future of the organization.191 
Throughout this period, the State Department officials, not 
surprisingly, maintained a strict policy stance of opposing any 
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emergent proposals to alter the UN Charter or establish a world 
government in its place.192 
In retrospect, there are two aspects of this historical period 
that are particularly noteworthy. The first is that there were 
major concerns about the United Nations and its ability to 
function. The Truman administration, members of Congress, 
and the American public were largely in agreement on this 
particular issue.193 The most effective solution, however, was 
certainly a matter of intense debate. Marshall, outlining the 
Truman administration’s position, explained to the House 
Committee: 
The United Nations was created after years of study and 
after many months of difficult negotiations. It now has 
58 members. It is the symbol of the aspirations of 
mankind . . . Let us not in our impatience and our fears 
sacrifice the hard-won gains that we now possess in the 
United Nations organization.194 
The second noteworthy aspect of this historical moment is 
that even the most seemingly far-fetched proposals for world 
government enjoyed support from serious, respected, powerful 
members of the public and the United States government.195 
Amazingly, the State Department felt compelled to address even 
the most fantastic plans for world government. Indeed, the 
majority of these proposals no doubt appear outlandish to the 
modern observer—as many apparently did to many observers at 
the time. But the point here is not to assess whether they 
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possessed any merit or how likely they were to succeed; it is to 
document a contextual reality and to show that the range of 
possible solutions for the issues of human organization was, in 
the minds of many, far broader and more open to such 
possibilities than it is now. Even with the State Department’s 
lack of enthusiasm for virtually all of the existing world 
government proposals, advocates for institutional change had 
made significant political inroads in the Congress. Their 
greatest political and legislative successes, however, were at the 
state level. 
C. STATE POLITICAL SUPPORT FOR WORLD GOVERNMENT 
By 1950, states had adopted resolutions in favor of world 
government.196 Many of the states that passed or considered 
such resolutions used similar language in their resolutions. 
There were a number of different resolutions of varying 
strengths and emphases circulating in state legislatures. Rather 
than passing world government resolutions outright, some 
states took initial steps to study the issue before taking any 
decisive action on the matter. For example, on May 6, 1949, the 
Maryland General Assembly—that state’s legislative body—
approved Senate Joint Resolution 23 (“S.J. Res. 23”): “Joint 
Resolution requesting the Governor of Maryland to appoint a 
Commission to study the advisability of the State of Maryland 
urging the United States to take the initiative in strengthening 
the United Nations Organization.”197 
Under the provisions of S.J. Res. 23, Maryland’s General 
Assembly called on the Governor to establish a commission that 
was to be comprised of at least ten members: two from the 
Maryland judiciary, four from the Maryland State Assembly, 
and the remainder to be selected from the state of Maryland at 
large.198 The resolution recognized the same public mood 
evidenced in the United States Congressional hearings. It 
referenced a “world situation in which the fear of war is ever 
present,” and cited a collective “sense of insecurity” the 
background condition behind the measure.199 But the chief 
concern as expressed in the resolution was “the lack of effective 
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international law to govern the nations of the world.”200 Just as 
the Truman administration and the United States Congress had 
acknowledged, the text of the Resolution similarly suggested 
that the United Nations was not equipped to address exigent 
global circumstances.201 The Resolution noted within its text 
that two other nearby states like Massachusetts and 
Connecticut, as well as other “sister states,” had already decided 
how to address these matters of global concern, namely, by 
adopting measures that sought to strengthen the “United 
Nations organization with a view of changing it from its present 
powerless state . . . to the status of a strictly limited World 
Federal Government.”202 The question to be placed before the 
Maryland Commission was whether the state should join them. 
It is important not to make too much of proposals like this 
one in terms of it being a piece of legislation with legal teeth. The 
Maryland Resolution only called for a committee to be created to 
study the issue. If the commission reported favorably about the 
matter of world government, then the issue might be placed on 
the ballot in upcoming state elections. If the voters in turn 
approved the world government resolution before them, then 
depending on the precise wording of the ultimate resolution, the 
Maryland State Assembly would urge those responsible for such 
matters in the federal government to take necessary actions 
toward strengthening the United Nations or establishing a 
world government. 
The state of Connecticut, as referenced in the Maryland 
initiative, was a step or two ahead. The Connecticut State 
legislature had already approved Connecticut Public Act No. 5: 
“An Act Concerning Question Concerning Charter of United 
Nations” several months earlier in 1948.203 After putting the 
question to its citizens several months later, Connecticut voters 
approved the initiative that appeared on their ballots as the 
following proposition: 
Do you, as a sovereign citizen of Connecticut and the 
United States of America, direct our representatives in 
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the national congress to urge the president and the 
congress to take the lead in calling for amendments to 
the United Nations charter strengthening the United 
Nations into a limited world federal government capable 
of enacting, interpreting and enforcing laws to prevent 
war?204 
The text of this resolution was very similar to some of the many 
non-binding resolutions that various states passed within their 
legislatures. A standard example was that of New Hampshire’s 
“Joint Resolution Relating to World Government” which was 
approved on April 7, 1949.205 Its solution to the problems facing 
the United Nations was to establish “a world federal 
government, universal and strong enough to prevent armed 
conflict between nations, and having direct jurisdiction over the 
individual in those matters within its authority.”206 The 
resolution directed its state representatives in the United States 
Congress to: 
[T]ake the initiative in requesting amendments to the 
United Nations Charter strengthening the United 
Nations into a limited world federal government capable 
of enacting, interpreting and enforcing laws to prevent 
war. The secretary of state is directed to send a copy of 
this resolution to our representatives in the national 
Congress, to the speaker of the national house of 
representatives, to the president of the national senate 
and to the President of the United States.207 
In the spring of 1949, the Oklahoma legislature adopted a 
much more strongly-worded resolution which could only take 
effect if it received a majority of votes in the state’s referendum 
elections the following year.208 This resolution was entitled 
Senate Joint Resolution No. 3: “Amendment to Charter of the 
United Nations.”209 The following text, which appeared on the 
ballot, was a very brief, truncated version of the actual 
resolution. 
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[I]t is the wish of the people of Oklahoma that the 
delegates of the United States to the United Nations 
propose or support amendments to the charter of the 
United Nations which will strengthen the United 
Nations and make it a world federal government able to 
prevent war.210 
Interestingly, the full resolution called for much stronger 
institutional and legal provisions than what was conveyed in the 
ballot measure. In part, it read: 
WHEREAS, the security of the people of Oklahoma and 
other States of the United States requires the 
establishment of a supra-national authority with power 
(1) to define “war crimes” and criminal acts menacing the 
peace of the world; and (2) to cause the arrest and lawful 
trial of persons accused of such crimes, and to provide for 
the lawful punishment of persons thus convicted of such 
crimes . . . WHEREAS, the Charter of the United 
Nations does not provide for the establishment of a 
supra-national authority possessing these powers.211 
Although most of the states only adopted non-binding 
resolutions, several states took a much more dramatic approach 
to the issue.212 Instead of simply urging the appropriate 
representatives to consider transforming the United Nations 
into a world government, these states passed resolutions calling 
for a constitutional convention to amend the United States 
Constitution in order to require the creation and participation in 
world government. For instance, in April 1949, the California 
Assembly approved Joint Resolution No. 26: “Relative to the 
Participation of the United States in a World Federal 
Government.”213 
The text of the resolution began like most of the other 
resolutions, containing a basis of the issue and a description of 
the perceived problem. In particular, it referenced the 
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technological developments in atomic weaponry that had 
appeared publicly only after the United Nations Charter was 
drafted: 
WHEREAS, war is now a threat to the very existence of 
our civilization, because modem science has produced 
weapons of war which are overwhelmingly destructive 
and against which there is no sure defense.214 
Similar to many other state resolutions, it suggested that the 
United Nations was not in a position to be able to ensure 
international peace and security: 
WHEREAS, the United Nations, as presently 
constituted, although accomplishing great good in many 
fields, lacks authority to enact, interpret or enforce world 
law, and under its present [C]harter is incapable of 
restraining any major nations which may foster or 
foment war.215 
Resolution No. 26 referenced the fact that other states had 
considered the issue and passed resolutions outlining a position 
in favor of world government: 
WHEREAS, many states have memorialized Congress, 
through resolutions by their state legislatures or in 
referenda by their voters, to initiate steps toward the 
creation of a world federal government reserving to the 
nations and to the people those rights not specifically 
granted as necessary to the establishment of the 
maintenance of world law and order.216 
But unlike most of the others, to date, this resolution contained 
the following text: 
[N]ow, therefore, be it . . . Resolved, By the Assembly and 
Senate of the State of California, jointly, [t]hat 
application is hereby made to the Congress of the United 
States, pursuant to Article V of the Constitution of the 
United States, to call a convention for the sole purpose of 
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proposing amendment of the Constitution to expedite 
and insure the participation of the United States in a 
world federal government, open to all nations, with 
powers which, while defined and limited, shall be 
adequate to preserve peace, whether the proposed 
charter or constitution of such world federal government 
be presented in the form of amendments to the [C]harter 
of the United Nations, or by a world constitutional 
convention, or otherwise.217 
By taking stock of the legal failures that have heretofore 
been overlooked by scholars, the entire Bricker narrative is now 
turned on its head. Although Bricker is generally associated 
with the idea to amend the Constitution to achieve his political 
goals, the movement for world government actually began long 
before him. Bricker was merely reacting to a similar, yet polar 
opposite strategy of amendment. The first largescale attempts to 
amend the Constitution were to require a radical, global 
restructuring of the domestic and international realms. 
Bricker’s attempt was designed to prevent it. 
D. THE IMPACT OF THE WORLD GOVERNMENT MOVEMENT 
Though this oft-forgotten movement was ultimately 
unsuccessful, the historical record reveals the lasting effects of 
its efforts. One of the primary consequences was to inspire the 
political backlash of which Senator Bricker was a part. The 
movement proposed a revolutionary restructuring of the United 
States’ relationship with the rest of the world. Its ambitions 
were extreme and readily challenged by opponents. In just a few 
years, nearly every state that passed a world government 
resolution rescinded it through formal legislative process. Ideas 
for world government were quickly swept aside even by former 
supporters.218 
Yet while the new world order envisioned by world 
government supporters did not materialize, several ideas 
contained within the movement did take hold internationally. 
Chief among these was the need for international institutions to 
regulate the new state of affairs. As World War II was coming to 
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an end, the need to form international relationships beyond the 
nation state was widely recognized.219 The United Nations is one 
example of this need being met through the creation of an 
intergovernmental organization. But it was also recognized that 
the United Nations alone could not hold the weight of the world’s 
geopolitical needs. For many in the United States during the late 
1940s and early 1950s, world government was the solution to 
this latter realization. 
World government was, however, just one of many 
responses to the problem. The idea of world government, though 
defeated, contained the seeds of other lasting institutions that 
emerged in its wake. The European Union, the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization, and the International Atomic Energy 
Agency are just a few of the numerous institutions and measures 
that emerged from this earlier impetus and that remain with us 
today.220 Thus, the ideas contained within a failed movement 
helped inspire the development of the contemporary structure of 
international institutions. 
Finally, the struggle between world government supporters 
and their opponents inspired a compromise that sheds a clear 
light on the contemporary conception of human rights in the 
United States. To appease both supporters and opponents of a 
stronger world order, political leaders reached a tacit agreement: 
the United States would strongly support human rights in the 
international arena, but not on domestic soil. Human rights 
would solely be an export commodity: something for the United 
States to offer its support internationally but conspicuously 
absent from the domestic arena. In time, however, the domestic 
absence of human rights lost its conspicuousness and became a 
taken for granted reality. Few Americans are consciously aware 
of the historical roots of this domestic void. 
 
 219. See generally EVAN LUARD, A HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS 
VOLUME 1: THE YEARS OF WESTERN DOMINATION, 1945-1955, at 21–25 (1982) 
(discussing the post-World War II realization that many states had concerning 
forming a supranational, conflict-mediating organization). 
 220. See DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 12, at 212 (stating that the Rome Treaty 
that lead to the formation of the European Economic Community, now known 
as the European Union, was ratified in 1957); A Short History of NATO, NATO, 
http://www.nato.int/history/nato-history.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2016) 
(stating that the North Atlantic Treaty was signed on 4 April, 1949); History, 
INT’L ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, https://www.iaea.org/about/overview/history 
(last visited Nov. 14, 2016) (stating that the “IAEA was created in 1957 in 
response to the deep fears and expectations generated by the discoveries and 
diverse uses of nuclear technology”). 
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Given its lasting influence, it is perhaps surprising that 
within the existing literature on the history of human rights, it 
appears that the movement for world government never even 
happened. As this Article has endeavored to illustrate, the 
historical record is replete with evidence of the movement in 
newspaper articles, Congressional hearings, debates, 
resolutions, State Department records, books, magazine articles, 
documents from state legislatures, and so forth, all lying hidden 
in plain sight.221 And just as with the Bricker controversy, the 
legacies of the world government movement abound. 
IV. LESSONS FROM LEGAL FAILURES 
Through a largely neglected account of the struggles 
involving a failed constitutional amendment, an overturned 
court case, and the forgotten movement for world government, 
this Article illustrates a simple proposition for historical legal 
scholarship: laws, ideas, and institutions that appear in 
hindsight to be failures can, and do, alter the course of history. 
Crucially, the new research approach outlined herein allows 
scholars to access this formerly unknown history that has 
shaped the contemporary world of human rights. In this Article, 
Senator John Bricker’s attempts to amend the United States 
Constitution serve as a historical entry point for an analysis of 
now-forgotten struggles that have fundamentally shaped the 
development of human rights in the United States and continue 
to exert an influence on contemporary affairs. The analysis 
affirms that a complete explanatory account of contemporary 
institutions and practices must include not only those laws, 
institutions, ideas, and practices that persist into the present 
day, but also the numerous institutional and ideational 
antecedents that are no longer part of contemporary 
understandings, structures, and practices (but were 
nevertheless extremely influential in terms of contemporary 
outcomes). Part IV of this Article synthesizes the contributions, 
 
 221. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, OFFICE OF PUB. AFF., supra note 22 
(outlining the role of the international community and the possibility of a form 
of world government); Preliminary Draft of a World Constitution, supra note 5 
(explaining that there was a committee devoted to creating a world 
constitution); Kaufman & Whiteman, supra note 42, at 321–32 (discussing how 
Senator Bricker spent the majority of his time on the Senate floor in 1953 
discussing the world government movement); Guide to the Beardsley Ruml 
Papers, supra note 148 (discussing support for the world government 
movement). 
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consequences, and normative implications of this new approach, 
as well as the history it uncovers. 
As this Article makes clear, existing scholarship focuses a 
great deal on Senator Bricker’s opposition to international 
human rights treaties, infringements on sovereignty and 
Constitutional provisions, and communism. At one level, 
understanding Bricker’s contemporary influence requires 
understanding and taking stock of his opposition against these 
concepts. At the same time, leaving the historical analysis 
unexplored severely impedes a full understanding of the history. 
Such analysis is a prerequisite for fully appreciating the nature 
of all that the contemporary world has inherited from the past. 
First, concepts such as human rights, sovereignty, 
communism, and so forth are abstract and void of inherent 
meaning on their own. Indeed, as a practical matter, one does 
not actually fight against such concepts per se, but against what 
those concepts mean within the given social, political, legal and 
historical context. Second, although they are extremely familiar, 
these concepts are not naturally occurring entities. They require 
individuals, groups, organizations—people—to define them with 
respect to some underlying reality and to fight for them. So on 
the one hand, it is indeed instructive to acknowledge and take 
stock of the concepts and ideas that Bricker was in opposition to. 
On the other hand, however, identifying the concepts is only a 
very small part of a much broader conflict over the meaning of 
those concepts, and therefore the overall historical story they 
tell. Thus, in this kind of historical inquiry, once a concept is 
identified as a key node of conflict, it is essential to incorporate 
two questions into the analysis: First, what are the conflicting 
meanings of those concepts within the given context? And 
second, who is advocating for the conflicting meanings on each 
side of the debate? Within the following example, the reasons for 
this approach become clear. 
It is most evident that one cannot rely on Bricker’s depiction 
of the controversy as representing the truth. As this Article has 
shown, Bricker is prone to exaggeration and outright fabrication. 
Nevertheless, his rhetoric provides an entry point for situating 
his response—as influential as it was—within the historical 
context from which it came. If one shifts the analysis from simply 
looking at concepts such as human rights, international treaties, 
and sovereignty, for instance, and instead opens the inquiry to 
focus on who he is fighting against and what those concepts in 
the dispute actually mean in context, an immense, overlooked 
portion of the historical record instantly comes to light. 
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Immediately, these two questions open the door to a far more 
expansive story that stretches years, if not decades, prior to 
Bricker’s resolutions. The long, protracted battle extends far 
beyond the halls of the United S Senate, implicating a set of 
events that scholars have never fully connected with Bricker, nor 
have they chronicled their momentous influence on the present 
world. 
In reviewing this history, it becomes apparent that Bricker 
was one part of a much larger struggle over how nations and 
their citizens were to organize themselves in the years following 
World War II.222 Developing a new understanding of the human 
rights concept—along with the necessary laws and institutions 
in both the international and domestic realms for realizing that 
particular concept—was a focal point in that struggle. What 
emerged during these domestic struggles over the emergent 
post-World War II human rights concept was a domestic 
definition of human rights that we have carried into the present. 
Today, it is generally taken for granted and accepted within the 
United States that this international-only conception of human 
rights is “just the way it is,” and presumed to have always been 
so, if the matter even rises to consciousness in the first 
instance.223 Though even if one were to consciously consider the 
upshot of this international-only conception of human rights, it 
would likely seem self-evident that international human rights 
have no political impact on domestic events in the United States. 
The history, as presented in this Article, shows otherwise. This 
particular conception of human rights was created in large 
measure to secure victory in a series of ongoing domestic political 
battles. This history also shows that the contemporary 
understanding of human rights within the United States is not 
one that is inevitable or perpetual. It can just as easily—that is, 
through domestic political struggles—be transformed into 
something else entirely. The normative question that follows 
close behind these observations and assertions is whether 
incorporating international human rights into domestic law is 
necessary and productive, or wrong-headed and destructive. 
 
 222. See ROBERTS, supra note 6, at 72–76 (discussing the general opposition 
against the idea of human rights after World War II from individuals, 
mainstream groups, nations, conservative leaders, and progressive scholars). 
 223. See generally Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a 
Difference, 111 YALE L.J. 1935, 1937–42 (2002) (discussing that although the 
United States and other countries often sign human rights treaties, they do not 
always comply with them). 
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With knowledge of this history, advocates today might 
legitimately worry that pushing for domestic recognition of 
human rights would be counterproductive for their causes. As 
experienced during the 1940s and 1950s, the backlash for such 
attempts was swift, severe, and long lasting.224 But as the 
history also shows, from such failures came lasting changes in 
civil rights practices and laws.225 New international and regional 
organizations emerged as well.226 Strong notions of domestic 
human rights and global political institutions never came to 
fruition, but they did offer a credible threat for those who sought 
to hold on to segregation and American isolationism. That 
credible threat applied an additional force upon the ongoing 
social and political issues of the moment. Yet, in the 
contemporary United States there is no such force to leverage. 
The possibility of even suggesting that human rights could be 
leveraged at home is absent, in great measure because of the 
outcomes of the history described in this Article. 
If human rights are to one day be incorporated into United 
States law and politics, the existing conceptual definition of 
human rights—as soft obligations entirely separate from 
domestic law—cannot do. After all, it is entirely incompatible 
with the notion of domestic incorporation. But it is also just a 
conception that was created in the midst of domestic political 
and social struggles. It can be redefined anew within the course 
of other domestic struggles, of which there are countless to 
choose from: Black Lives Matter, the 99%, the war on religion, 
and so forth. What is crucial to recognize, though, is that the 
understanding of human rights that emerges from such 
struggles does not necessarily have to be a meaning that benefits 
the poor and the downtrodden. In fact, the ability to define 
human rights requires a power and unity of purpose that either 
side of such struggles can effect. Human rights can be just as 
 
 224. MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE OF 
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 12 (2000) (discussing how the choice of civil rights 
activists to air their grievances at the United Nations was viewed as a “great 
breach of loyalty,” and led to the further silencing of civil rights advocates 
through passport restrictions and red-baiting). 
 225. See id. at 209–10 (discussing how the international reaction to the state 
of civil rights in the United States helped the passage of the Civil Rights Act 
1964). 
 226. Kim D. Reiman, A View from the Top: International Politics, Norms and 
the Worldwide Growth of NGOs, 50 INT’L STUD. Q. 45, 45 (2006) (discussing the 
rapid growth of nongovernmental organizations in the post-World War II 
period). 
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easily defined to help maintain the status quo and to assist the 
elite. 227 
In the end, perhaps the matter is not as momentous as it 
seems. Perhaps opponents do not have to be so fearful of 
“external” human rights laws restricting their freedoms and 
altering their way of life; the past seven decades show that it 
certainly possible to define human rights in such a way that they 
are actually quite consistent with any notion of freedom or any 
particular way of living. But there is a bigger issue that has for 
the past seventy years been hidden beneath the supposed 
specter of “foreign law,” and has been the cause of such 
apprehension and opposition against international human 
rights. The opponents of bringing international human rights 
into the domestic arena fear that existing political struggles and 
longstanding ideological battles covering the entire range of 
issues in the United States would be upended and indeed they 
would.228 If human rights did possess normative legitimacy in 
the domestic United States context, they most certainly would 
catapult the now-deadlocked balance of power in American 
politics towards horizons never before seen. It was this 
particular vision of legal integration that caused the opponents 
in the 1950s to react so strongly and organize so rapidly. But 
interestingly, the wellspring of hope that the possibility of 
domestic human rights provided for many Americans in the 
1940s and 1950s seems today to have run dry. Today they are 
not a domestic option; nor are they much of a thought. 
What all of this means is simple: the United States’ 
international-only conception of human rights is wrong. Human 
rights battles are local, and the United States’ international-
only understanding of them has served as silent proxy for a 
broad swath of social, political, and economic issues ranging 
from healthcare, voting rights, race, business, to education, 
 
 227. See generally Hathaway, supra note 223, at 1940 (finding that “not a 
single treaty for which ratification seems to be reliably associated with better 
human rights practices and several for which it appears to be associated with 
worse practices . . . human rights treaties may sometimes lead to poorer human 
rights practices within the countries that ratify them.”). 
 228. See generally Amy C. Harfeld, Oh Righteous Delinquent One: The 
United States’ International Human Rights Double Standard - Explanation, 
Example, and Avenues for Change, 4 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 59, 68 (2001) (discussing 
that “[o]pponents of human-rights treaty ratification have justified their 
position with a wide array of arguments” including that ratification would 
“diminish fundamental American rights; violate states’ rights,” and more). 
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disability issues, homeschooling, and so forth. The way that the 
opponents once dealt with the threat was to delegitimize the 
human rights idea in the domestic context while allowing it to 
flourish internationally as the solution to global problems. 
Interestingly, and to a great extent, the strongest proponents of 
human rights in the United States have fallen in line and do the 
same. 
Conclusion 
The goal of this Article has been threefold. First, the Article 
aimed to identify collective analytic blind spots in the history of 
human rights and outline an approach that permits scholars to 
see within the historical record what has formerly been invisible. 
This analytic approach emphasizes understanding the formative 
role of overlooked laws, ideas, and institutions that failed to 
endure yet have had a lasting influence on United States 
politics. Second, the Article endeavored to apply this new 
analytic framework to a well-known historical event 
surrounding human rights in the United States—the Bricker 
controversy—and to show that we have missed much of the story 
to date. The Article marshals an impressive amount of newly 
uncovered original evidence to open a historical door that most 
never even knew was there. Finally, the Article aimed to 
demonstrate the profound contemporary implications of the 
prevailing conception of human rights within the United States. 
In outlining a new approach to such legal and historical 
inquiries, revealing previously unknown aspects of the history of 
human rights in the United States, and demonstrating the 
lasting influence of now-forgotten events, this Article shows that 
contemporary conceptions of human rights are not in fact 
international but rather reflect local struggles, the outcomes of 
which persist for decades  
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World Government 
 S. Res. 183, 79th Cong. (1945) (“Creation of a World 
Republic”) 
o Senator Glen H. Taylor (D., Idaho) 
o October 24, 1945 
 S. Con. Res. 54, 80th Cong. (1948) 
o Proposed Meeting Of President-Elect Of United 
States And Marshal Stalin Concerning World 
Government 
o Senator Glen H. Taylor 
 H. Con. Res. 64, 81st Cong. (1949) (“World Federation”) 
o Representatives Brooks Hays (D., Arkansas) and 
Walter H. Judd (R., Minnesota), and eventually 111 
co-sponsors. 
 S. Con. Res. 56, 81st Cong. (1949) (“World Federation”) 
o Senator Charles W. Tobey (R., New Hampshire) and 
eventually 21 co-sponsors 
o Identical to H. Con. Res 64 (1949) 
 S. Con. Res. 66, 81st Cong. (1949) (“World Government 
Constitution”) 
o Senator Glen H. Taylor (D., Idaho), September 
13,1949 
 
Strengthening the UN by Amending the UN Charter 
 H. Con. Res. 163, 80th Cong. (1948) (“Culbertson ABC 
Plan”) 
o Representative Walter H. Judd (R., Minnesota) 
and fourteen cosponsors, including Richard 
Nixon (R., California, HCR-170) 
o Identical to S. Con. Res. 50 (1948) 
 S. Con. Res. 50, 80th Cong. (1948) 
o Requesting the President to initiate measures 
for a revision of the United Nations Charter 
o Senator Homer Ferguson (R., Michigan) and 
fifteen cosponsors, March 16, 1948 
o Identical to H. Con. Res. 163 (1948) 
 H.R. Res. 6802, 80th Cong. (1948) (“Strengthening The 
United Nations”) 
o Representative Charles Eaton (R., New Jersey) 
for the House Foreign Affairs Committee 
o June 9, 1948 
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 S. Res. 239, 80th Cong. (1948) (“Regional Security”) 
o Passed, June 11,1948 (vote of 64-4) 
o Senator Arthur Vandenberg (R., Michigan) for 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
 S. Res. 133, 81st Cong. (1949) (“World Alliance”) 
o Senator John Sparkman (D., Alabama) and 
nine cosponsors, including Karl E. Mundt (R., 
South Dakota) and John Stennis (D., 
Mississippi) 
 S. Res. 95, 80th Cong. (1947) (“World Disarmament 
Conference”) 
o Senator Millard Tydings (D., Maryland) 
 H. Con. Res. 163, 80th Cong. (1948) (“Culbertson ABC 
Plan”) 
o Identical to S. Con. Res. 50 (1948) 
o Representative Walter H. Judd (R., Minnesota) 
and fourteen cosponsors, including Richard 
Nixon (R., California, HCR-170) 
 S. Con. Res. 50, 80th Cong. (1948) (“Culbertson ABC 
Plan”) 
o Senator Homer Ferguson (R., Michigan) and 
fifteen cosponsors, March 16, 1948 [Identical to 
HCR-163] 
 S. Res. 239, 80th Cong. (1948) (“Regional Security”) 
o Passed, June 11,1948 (vote of 64-4) 
o Senator Arthur Vandenberg (R., Michigan) for 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
 S. Res. 133, 81st Cong. (1949) (“World Alliance”) 
o Senator John Sparkman (D., Alabama) and 
nine cosponsors, including Karl E. Mundt (R., 
South Dakota) and John Stennis (D., 
Mississippi) 
 
Working with the UN 
 S. Con. Res. 72, 81st Cong. (1950) 
o February 7, 1950 
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Regional Federation 
 S. Con. Res. 10, 80th Cong. (1947) (“United States of 
Europe”) 
o Senators J. William Fulbright (D., Arkansas) 
and Elbert D. Thomas (D., Utah) 
o March 21, 1947 
 S. Con. Res. 12, 80th Cong. (1947) (“United Democratic 
States Of Europe”) 
o Senator Alexander Wiley (R., Wisconsin) 
o Identical to S. Con. Res. 24 
 S. Con. Res. 12, 81st Cong. (1949) (“European 
Federation”) 
o Senators J. William Fulbright (D., Arkansas) 
and Elbert D. Thomas (D., Utah) 
 North Atlantic Treaty, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, 34 
U.N.T.S. 243. 
o First peacetime military alliance the U.S. 
entered outside the Western Hemisphere. 
 S. Con. Res. 57, 81st Cong. (1949) (“Atlantic Union”) 
o Senator Estes Kefauver (D., Tennessee) and 
eventually 20 co-sponsors, including Walter F. 
George (D., Georgia), Guy M. Gillette (D., 
Iowa), J. William Fulbright (D., Arkansas), 
Harley M. Kilgore (D., West Virginia), Lister 
Hill (D., Alabama), John Sparkman (D., 
Alabama), Joseph R. McCarthy (R., Wisconsin) 
o July 26, 1949 
 H. Con. Res. 107–111, 81st Cong. (1949) (“Atlantic 
Union”) 
o Representative Walter H. Judd (R., Minnesota) 
and four co-sponsors, including Hale Boggs (D., 
Louisiana) and James W. Wadsworth (R., New 
York) 
o Identical to S. Con. Res. 57 (1949) 
o July 26, 1949 
 S. Con. Res. 52, 81st Cong. (1949) 
o Supplemental Agreement Of The United 
Nations To Aid Signatories In Case Of Attack 
o Senators Elbert Thomas (D. Utah) and Paul H. 
Douglas (D., Illinois) 
o Plan to work within the UN / NATO for security 
agreement. 
